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CASE COMMENTS
RECIPROCITY AS A BASIS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF DENYING PROPOSED CONGLOMERATE MERGER
Inasmuch as preliminary injunctive relief may have a conclusive
effect in merger cases, causing the parties to abandon their plans
rather than await the result of expensive and prolonged litigation,1
courts have recognized preliminary relief as a serious remedy.2 Courts
also realize that the record is less comprehensive at the time of the
application for preliminary relief than at the time of a final hearing,
and thus the rule has developed that the party seeking the relief must
show a reasonable chance of ultimately prevailing on ,the merits by
showing a probability of a lessening of competition3 and a reasonable
probability of success on final hearing.4 It is therefore significant in
the light of the development of this rule that preliminary injunctive
relief was granted in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Con-
solidated Industries, Inc.5 on grounds of mere possibility of reciprocity.
Reciprocity is the business practice of favoring one's customers in
purchasing commodities sold by them to obtain favorable treatment in
return. To the extent that reciprocity may substantially lessen competi-
tion, it will be deemed one of the anticompetitive practices which the
antitrust laws prohibit.6 Since a merger increases 'the potential for
'United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 659 (D.N.J. 1964) (The
merger was abandoned shortly after the granting of preliminary injunctive relief.
1964 AN=TI sr & TRADE REG. REP. No. i8o, at B-2); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 541 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd. 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
2Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Gonsol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 510
(3d Cir. 1969); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch CO., 206 F.2d 738, 743 (2d
Cir. 1953); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 3oi F. Supp. lo66, 1097 (N.D.
fI1. 1969); United States v. Crysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 659 (D.N.J. 1964).
qTC v. Consolidated Food Corp., 38o U.S. 592, 598 (1965); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320o F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. xo6i (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Penick &- Ford,
Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518, 523 (D.N.J. 1965).
'United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. 1963); United
States v. International Tel. 9: Tel. Corp., 3o6 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Conn. 1969);
United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 3oi F. Supp. io66, 1095 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. io6i (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United
States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518, 523 (D.N.J. 1965).
r414 F.2d 506, 519, 532 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, go S. Ct. 567 (197o), rev'g
294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Allis-Chalmers].
0In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (x965), the Supreme
Court stated that reciprocity was one of the "anti-competitive practices at which
the antitrust laws are aimed." Accord, Allis-Chalmers at 519; United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. North-
west Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. io66 (N.D. 11 1969); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
19701
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reciprocal buying practices through economic concentration, the anti-
competitive effect of reciprocity may be thwarted in its incipiency by
granting preliminary injunctive relief in the pre-acquisition stage7 un-
der section 16 of the Clayton Act s to deny the accomplishment of a
proposed merger.
In Allis-Chalmers, a private antitrust action, White Consolidated,
a diversified manufacturer, purchased 31.2 percent of the outstanding
stock of Allis-Chalmers for the purpose of acquiring Allis-Chalmers.9
To facilitate the acquisition, White Consolidated proposed to make
a tender offer to Allis-Chalmers' stockholders. A preliminary injunc-
tion was then sought by Allis-Chalmers to prevent White Consolidated
from acquiring any additional stock and from exercising its share of
ownership in any manner that would promote its takeover objective.
Following the filing of this preliminary relief application, the dis-
trict court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order to prohibit
White Consolidated from taking any steps to acquire additional Allis-
Chalmers stock. 10
The particular facts in Allis-Chalmers in regard to the issue of
reciprocity were that Allis-Chalmers annually purchased approxi-
mately $44,00 0,000 in steel products." A White Consolidated subsidi-
ary, Blaw-Knox, was a major supplier of metal rolling mills to the
steel industry. White Consolidated bought approximately $42,000,000
in steel mill products annually. If the proposed merger were allowed,
'FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. io6i, io66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); American Smelting &
Ref. Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Del. 1969); United
States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651, 657 (D.N.J. 1964).
'Injunctive relief is provided for in section 16 as follows:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having juris-
diction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation
of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, x8, and 19 of this title,
when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon
the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction im-
providently granted and a showing that the danger or irreparable loss or
damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue....
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914)
(emphasis added).
'Allis-Chalmers at 508.
10Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263,
1265 n.1 (D. Del. 1969).
"Allis-Chalmers at 517-18, 519 n.22.
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an Allis-Chalmers and White Consolidated combination (Allis-Chal-
mers/White) would be the largest purchaser of steel products ($86,-
ooc,ooo annually) in the relevant rolling mill market and through its
Blaw-Knox subsidiary would be a substantial supplier of rolling mill
machines to the steel producers. This perhaps would compel the selec-
tion of Allis-Chalmers/White as a rolling mill supplier to the disad-
vantage of other rolling mill producers.
The issue of reciprocity was not presented to the district court for
its consideration, and the court held that Allis-Chalmers had failed
to show a probability of anticompetitive effects or a reasonable prob-
ability of success on a final trial of the antitrust issues. Hence, prelimi-
nary injunctive relief was denied.12 On appeal, the reciprocity issue
was presented and the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the pro-
posed merger of Allis-Chalmers and White Consolidated threatened to
enhance the power of these combined companies to engage in recipro-
cal dealing in the rolling mill market. Thus the preliminary injunc-
tion was granted, although only a possbility of reciprocity was shown.' 3
Inasmuch as the concept of reciprocity exists in other areas of the
law,' 4 a definition of reciprocity as a business practice will be helpful.
Reciprocity has been defined by the Supreme Court as "[a] threatened
withdrawal of orders if products of an affiliate cease being bought, as
well as a conditioning of future purchases on the receipts of orders for
products of that affiliate.. .. "15 Reciprocity may be expressed in its
most common form as "I will buy from you if you will buy from me."
A more complex form of reciprocity, referred to as "secondary recipro-
city," 6 involves a third party and occurs where A agrees to buy from
B because C, who is a customer of A, sells to B. 17
Reciprocity has been categorized by legal writers as either coercive
-'Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263,
1268 (D. Del. 1969).
IsAlthough the opinion of the court and the dissenting opinion discussed other
aspects of the case, the concurring opinion was limited to the issue of reciprocity
so that a majority was collected on that single issue. Allis-Chalmers at 526-27.
"'Reciprocity is used "in international law to describe the relation between
states or nations when each of them extends privileges and special advantages to
the subjects of the other...." Clostermann v. Schmidt, 215 Ore. 55, 332 P.2d
1o36, 1042 (1958). The term reciprocity is also employed in insurance law to
denote a "reciprocal insurance exchange." Farmers Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Mac-
Donald, 59 Wyo. 352, 140 P.2d 905, 914 (1943).
"FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 38o U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
1 Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 9
ANrnmrusr BuLL. 93, 97 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Krash].
"TSee United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 532 (W.D. Pa.),
afJ'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3 d Cir. 1963).
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or tacit.' 8 Coercive reciprocity involves express threats or promises by
the supplier which are intended to induce purchases by customers. The
anticompetitive effect of coercive reciprocity has been likened to tie-in
contracts19 since the company is saying in effect, "My order for your
goods is tied to the receipt of an order from you for my goods." 20 Tacit
reciprocity occurs where a large purchaser is able to influence the pur-
chases of his suppliers without express -threats or promises. Tacit recip-
rocity has been attributed to a "predilection of businessmen for an
easy sale and the propensity to show gratitude to those who have favor-
ed a seller with orders." 21 The reciprocity need not ensue from bludge-
oning or coercion to be an antitrust violation. 22 Thus either coercive23
or tacit24 reciprocity may be deemed an anticompetitive practice. It has
been suggested that the standard of proof for coercive reciprocity
should be higher than it is for tacit reciprocity because coercive recip-
rocity involves express threats or promises which must be clearly de-
monstrated.
25
The prohibition of reciprocity as an anticompetitive practice first
developed in the 193o's when the FTC decided three cases holding that
corecive reciprocity was violative of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Aot 26 as an unfair method of competition.27 Prior to its
1'Hinnegan, Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated
Foods Revisted, v7 BuFFALo L. REv. 631, 638 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hinnegan];
Handler, Gilding the Philosophic Pill-Trading Bows for Arrows, 66 COLUm. L.
REV., 1, 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Handler].
29Handler, supra note 18, at 5.
nOIn the tie-in arrangement the purchaser is allowed to buy Product X, a
commodity in high demand, only if Product Y, a less desirable commodity, is
also purchased. International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936). In the coercive reciprocity arrangement, using Allis-Chalmers as a hypo-
thetical illustration, the tied product, rolling mills, is the one being sold to
steel manufacturers, and the tying product is Allis-Chalmers/White's offer to place
a steel order.
2 Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint
Ventures, 49 VA. L. REv. 433, 435 (1963).
21FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 38o U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
mCalifronia Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16
F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
"'See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 32o F.2d 509 (3 d Cir. 1963); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 268 F. Supp. 769 (D.N.J. 1966).
OHandler, supra note 18, at 5.
38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (964).
"California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C.
67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
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amendment in 195o by the Celler-Kefauver Act,28 Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act 29 was not construed as a prohibition of reciprocity.30 However,
the amended section 3' has now been interpreted by courts to prohibit
reciprocal buying practices. 32 It specifically prohibits any corporation
engaged in commerce from acquiring all or part of the stock or as-
sets of any corporation also engaged in commerce if the effect in any
section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. Courts have fre-
quently employed section 7 in recent years to curtail the anticompe-
titive effects of the current enormous merger movement 33 in the Ameri-
can business community.
34
At the time that the Celler-Kefauver Act was being drafted, Con-
gressional hearings on the Act suggested that section 7 was meant to
be limited to situations where actual competition exists. 35 There has
also been a feeling that section 7 should not be construed by the courts
as a Congressional directive to attack economic concentration unless
315 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
OCh. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
3nSee Hinnegan, supra note 18, at 638-39.
3The pertinent provision of section 7 of the Clayton Act is as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital and no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
:=TC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3 d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
^'The trend toward economic concentration was described by a government
official in a Senate hearing:
Over the period 1948-66, 912 manufacturing and mining companies with
combined assets of $31 billion were acquired. About one-half of these
assets were acquired in the last 5 years of this 19-year period.
... Quite dearly, we are in the midst of an enormous merger movement.
Meuller, Hearings on the Status and Future of Small Business Before the Senate
Select Comm. on Small Business, 9oth Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 452 (1967).
"'FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States
v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
1-IH.R. REP. No. 1191, 8ist Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
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there has been a showing of harm to competition.3 0 Yet the attitude
of the present administration in the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department strongly suggests that section 7 is considered a Congres-
sional mandate to curb the trend toward economic concentration.3 7
Although officials in the present administration have urged that sec-
tion 7 be construed in various ways to prohibit anticompetitive prac-
tices, their statements indicate that they have only begun to restrain
reciprocity.
38
Only five years ago, reciprocity was characterized by the Supreme
Court as a novel theory in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.39 That
case was the Court's first construction of the amended section 7 on the
subject of reciprocity as an anticompetitive practice. In 1951, Con-
solidated Foods, a large, diversified processor, wholesaler and retailer
of food products, acquired Gentry, Inc. Gentry had been one of the
two leading producers of dehydrated onion and garlic. Prior to the
Consolidated Foods/Gentry merger, Gentry had 28 percent of the
dried onion market in 195o while Basic Vegetables Products, Inc., its
principal competitor, accounted for 6o percent of the same market.
By 1958, Gentry's percentage had risen to 35 percent while Basic's
portion had dropped to 57 percent of the market.40
The merger was challenged almost seven years after its consumma-
tion when the FTC issued a complaint in late 1957 for violation of
seotion 7 of the Clayton Act. The merger was struck down in a hear-
ing before the FTC because it gave Gentry the anticompetitive ad-
"Donald F. Turner, immediately prior to becoming Chief of the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, stated: "I do not believe Congress has given
the courts and the FTC a mandate to campaign against super-concentration in
the absence of any evidence of harm to competition." Turner, Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAiv. L. REV. 1313, 1395 (1965).
37Richard W. McLaren, new Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department, has said that the government will institute litigation "even at the
risk of losing some cases to lind out how far § 7 will go toward halting the
trend toward economic concentration." [1967-1969 Transfer Binder], 5 TRADE
REG. REP. 50,235 (1969).
3 McLaren stated that the government has made "only a start in the reciprocity
area" in its attempt to restrain reciprocity as an anti-competitive practice. The
Evening Star (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 24, 1969, at A-4 , col. 5. See also Wilson,
FTC Division Chief Gives His Views on Reciprocity, 44o ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. A-13 (Dec. 16, 1969).
3"38o U.S. 592, 602 (1965); cf. California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937);
Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co, 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
4 0Although Consolidated-Gentry's share of the dehydrated onion market in-
creased 7% in the period following the merger, its percentage of the garlic market
fell 12% below Gentry's market share at the time of acquisition. FTC v. Con-
solidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
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vantage of reciprocity which was not available to its competitors and
would tend to foreclose them from a substantial market.41 Although
the Seventh Circuit reversed this holding by the FTC,42 the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals, reinstated the FTC
decision and held that the merger should be invalidated. 43 Mr. Justice
Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court, declaring that section 7 of
the Clayton Act is concerned "with probabilities, not certainties." 44
He further stated that reciprocity would violate section 7 only "if the
probability of a lessening of competition is shown," 45 adding that
[n]o group acquiring a company with reciprocal ,buying oppor-
tunities is entitled to a "free trial" period. To give it such would
be to distort the scheme of § 7. The "mere possibility" of the
prohibited restraint is not enough.
46
Ostensibly, Douglas was making a distinction between the require-
ments for demonstrating illegal reciprocity. There need not be a
certainty that reciprocal buying will ensue upon consummation of the
merger but there must be at least a demonstration of a probability.
The mere possibility of reciprocity occurring after completion of the
merger will not be sufficient.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart argued that "the op-
portunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to invalidate a merger
under § 7."47 There must be more than a "bare potential for recipro-
cal buying to bring a merger within the ban of § 7."48 He further
stated that "the record should be clear and convincing that the re-
quisite probability [of illegal reciprocal buying] is present."
49
Because Allis-Chalmers did not require clear and convincing evi-
dence that the potential for reciprocity be present before invalidating
the proposed merger between Allis-Chalmers and White Consolidated,
the dissenting opinion in that case viewed "this approach to be an un-
charted excursion into a sensitive area of the American economic com-
munity, embracing a truly radical concept ... in antitrust law . . .,50
White Consolidated had contended that Allis-Chalmers' steel pur-
chases of $44,000,00 would amount to only 1/4 of one percent of the
"Consolidated Foods Corp., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP.
16,182 (FTC 1962).
,Consolidated Foods Corp. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1964).
": 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
44d. at 595; accord, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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total steel sales of the principal buyers of rolling mills from Blaw-Knox
and that this was an insignificant amount.51 In support of the con-
tention, counsel for White Consolidated cited Consolidated Foods for
the proposition that "[s]ome situations may amount only to de mini-
mis." -5 2 They also cited Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,
where it was stated that "less than i% [actually -77%] is, conserva-
tively speaking, quite insubstantial." 53 The concurring opinion re-
jected this contention, stating that the proper comparison was between
the steel purchasing power of Allis-Chalmers and that of Blaw-Knox's
competitors in the rolling mill industry. This comparison would dem-
onstrate that Allis-Chalmers is a substantial buyer of steel in relation
to other rolling mill suppliers.54 The majority opinion also stated that
Allis-Chalmers/White "would buy a far larger amount of steel than
any of Blair-Knox's competitors in the rolling mill market."5 5 The
dissenting judge vehemently disagreed, declaring that
From the barest of facts, the majority have conjured vivid
overtones of reciprocity in the rolling mill-steel industries ....
The trial record on this point is anything but clear and
convincing; it suffers from factual anemia and an examination
discloses that it is symptomatic of only a bare suspicion of pos-
sible reciprocity.5
6
It may be that Allis-Chalmers is vulnerable to criticism on the
point that 'the Allis-Chalmers' steel purchases were sufficient to dem-
onstrate a potential for reciprocity. 57 Although these purchases were
larger than those made by Blaw-Knox's competitors in the relevant
rolling mill market, they amounted to only 4 of one percent of all
steel sold by those steel companies who also bought rolling mills. In
adopting a realistic approach, it can hardly be said that of one
percent is a sufficient percentage of the market to constitute leverage
for reciprocity.58
It has been suggested that the inherent danger of reciprocity po-
tential in conglomerate mergers can be reduced by a showing that
uld. at 527.
rAppellant's Brief for Certiorari at 12, White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 90 S. Ct. 567 (197o).
63Id. In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal CO., 365 U.S. 3ao (1961), the
Court had to determine whether the national or local sector was the relevant market.




5Id. at 518, 527.
rAHandler, supra note x8, at 8.
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suppliers of the acquiring company are substantial, powerful firms
who are unlikely to be influenced by a relatively small volume of
purchases from them by the acquiring company.59 In Allis-Chalmers
the huge steel companies who sold to Allis-Chalmers and bought roll-
ing mills from Blaw-Knox were substantial, powerful firms who were
not likely to be persuaded to engage in reciprocity on account of
Allis-Chalmers' relatively small volume of steel purchases.
On the other hand, it might be said that Allis-Chalmers' steel pur-
chases, even if small in comparison to total steel purchases, amounted
to 44,ooo,ooo and that this is a substantial dollar volume by any
standard.00 In addition, Allis-Chalmers/White would annually pur-
chase $86,ooo,ooo in steel products from 'the purchasers of rolling
mills.01 This volume of steel purchases would be far larger than the
amount purchased by any of Blaw-Knox's competitors. If the Allis-
Chalmers/White management were shrewd in channeling this volume
to those steel companies who expressed a willingness to increase their
rolling mill purchases from Blaw-Knox, the volume might be sufficient
to foreclose Blaw-Knox's four principal competitors from the sub-
stantial steel rolling mill market.
To demonstrate any significant potential for reciprocity it has been
said that (i) a company must be a larger purchaser of the buyers'
products than its competitors; (2) these purchases must be in such
quantity as to constitute effective reciprocity leverage (purchases, in-
substantial as compared with total sales, even if larger than the com-
petitor's, will not normally cause a shift in buying); (3) the nature of
the product and the market must be conducive to reciprocity prac-
tices; and (4) there must be more than the mere possibility that re-
ciprocity will cause an anticompetitive effect. 2
In Allis-Chalmers there was no evidence or suggestion that re-
ciprocity had been practiced in the rolling mill market or that the
structure of the market or the nature of the product was conducive to
reciprocity practices. 63 There was no evidence that Allis-Chalmers/
White steel purchases, even if larger than those of other rolling mill
OKrash, supra note 16, at ioo.
6uSee United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 61 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (the court emphasized the substantial dollar volume of purchases by General
Dynamics in holding that a potential for reciprocity leverage existed).
6Allis-Chalmers at 518.
OTurner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1313, 1387-88 (1965); Krash, supra note 6, at ioo; Justice Dept. Merger
Guidelines, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] 1 TRADE REG. REP. ig(a), at 443o (1967).
OAppellant's Brief for Certiorari at 1-1% White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 90 S. Ct. 567 (1970).
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manufacturers, were so significant in volume as to influence steel
companies to shift their buying of rolling mills to Blaw-Knox, the
White Consolidated subsidiary. Notwithstanding the lack of such
evidence, the court held that there had been a sufficient demonstra-
tion of potential reciprocity to grant the preliminary injunctive relief
thwarting the proposed merger.64
Inasmuch as the sole evidence introduced on the reciprocity issue
was data showing that Allis-Chalmers was a larger steel purchaser
than any of Blaw-Knox's competitors in the rolling mill market,65 the
court based its holding on the reciprocity issue entirely on this data.
The court failed to differentiate between coercive or tacit recipro-
city,66 to ascertain if reciprocity had been practiced in the past by
Allis-Chalmers or White Consolidated, or to find whether it had been
practiced in the rolling mill market.67 The court did not pause to de-
fine the essential nature of the potential reciprocity but merely label-
ed the volume of Allis-Chalmers' steel purchases as sufficient to con-
stitute potential for illegal reciprocity.68 This method of finding re-
ciprocity potential without pausing to consider whether reciprocal
dealing will actually ensue from the proposed merger has been criti-
cized as "the modern practice of painting with a broad brush." 69 The
Supreme Court cautioned against the use of this method in Gonsoli-
dater Foods, when it stated that "[t]he 'mere possibility' of the pro-
hibited restraint is not enough.... [T]he force of § 7 is still in prob-
abilities ... "70
It therefore follows that a finding that reciprocity will possibly
lessen competition should not be sufficient.71 Although it has been
"Allis-Chalmers at 519, 527.
6d.
6Although either coercive or tacit reciprocity may be violative of section 7,
it has been suggested that courts should require a higher standard of proof for
coercive reciprocity than for tacit reciprocity because the former involves express
threats or promises which must be clearly demonstrated. Handler, supra note 18,
at. 5.
67Other courts have considered evidence of previous practices of reciprocity
by the acquiring company or its customers in ascertaining whether a potential for
reciprocity exists. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp.
766 (D. Conn. 1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
6'Allis-Chalmers at 518-19, 526-27.
6Handler, supra note 18, at 3.
10380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965).
7'United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 525 (3d Cir. x963); United
States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 3oi F. Supp. io66, 1097 (N.D. Il. 1969); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 3o3 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
CASE COMMENTS
suggested that words such as "probable" and "possible" are meaning-
less by themselves as tests or standards of legality,72 the word "prob-
able" indicates that there should be a substantial demonstration that
illegal reciprocity may ensue if the proposed merger is consummated.
As a matter of degree, "probable" lies somewhere between "possible"
and "certain." 73 The stricter test of "probability," even if meaning-
less by itself, becomes significant when applied to the context of a
particular fact situation.7 4 If this standard of probability is ignored
and the more lenient standard of mere possibility applied, as Allis-
Chalmers apparently did, the effect may be to prohibit acquisitions
which otherwise would have been lawful because the granting of pre-
liminary relief may cause the acquiring company to abandon its plans
rather than await the result of expensive and prolonged litigation.75
Two of the three judges in Allis-Chalmers may have sensed the
ramifications of basing potential reciprocity on the single fact that
Allis-Chalmers was a larger steel purchaser than any of Blaw-Knox's
competitors. Only the concurring judge felt that the single fact of
being a larger purchaser was sufficient to establish illegal reciprocity
potential.70 One judge, writing the opinion of the court, included
other issues in his holding, apparently feeling that the ground for
reciprocity was inadequate by itself to justify granting the preliminary
injunction. 77 The dissenting judge feared that such a holding would
deny the accomplishment of many lawful mergers because "[n]early
every acquisition has, to some extent, elements of reciprocity."Th
In two more recent decisions the courts apparently sensed the far-
reaching consequences of the Allis-Chalmers holding and were care-
ful not to apply the Allis-Chalmers standard. In United States v.
Northwest Industries, Inc.,79 the court denied the government's ap-
plication for a preliminary injunction to block a proposed merger
between Northwest Industries and B. F. Goodrich. The government
had presented evidence showing that Northwest had been engaged in
-Hinnegan, supra note 18, at 645.
71d.
7'Compare FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (x965), with Allis-
Chalmers.
-United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964) (The merger
was abandoned shortly after the granting of the preliminary injunction. 1964
AN=rrrusT & TRADF REG. REP. No. 18o, at B-2); United States v. Indersoll-Rand Co.,
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reciprocity in the past,8 0 and that a substantial number of the cus-
tomers or suppliers of both Goodrich and Northwest were companies
which practice reciprocity.8s The government also introduced the
testimony of a packing company representative who said that his
company had considered purchasing plastic film and tires from Good-
rich to obtain favorable treatment by Chicago and Northwestern
Railway, a Northwest subsidiary s2 In spite of such evidence appar-
ently showing a potential for illegal reciprocity,83 the court held that
there had been no specific demonstration of a substantial lessening of
competition as required by the Clayton Act.s 4
United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.s5
also required clear evidence to establish the potential for illegal re-
ciprocity. The court refused the government's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction to enjoin the proposed ITT-Grinnell Corp. merger.
The government had introduced evidence showing that ITT an-
nually purchased at least $35oooo,ooo worth of goods and services
from industries which account for 28 percent of total new plant ex-
penditures by all industries. Many of these ITT suppliers practice
reciprocity and would almost surely transfer their purchases of auto-
matic fire protection systems to Grinnell in order to enlarge the re-
spective amounts of goods and services purchased by ITT.s0 The court
held that even if the proposed merger would create an opportunity
for illegal reciprocity, it would not necessarily follow that this would
occur because ITT had a written policy against reciprocity and ITT's
organizational structure was not conducive to reciprocity.8 7
Allis-Chalmers may have lessened the requirements for a showing




"'The court stated that increasing the reciprocity potential was not sufficient:
While it is clear that the potential for reciprocity would be substanti-
ally increased, the extent to which actual reciprocity would be practiced
and, therefore, the probable actual anti-competitive effect thereof is,
on the basis of the present record, difficult if not impossible to forecast.
Id. at 1095.
"Id. at 1o96-97.
81506 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
8id. at 781.
81'IT introduced evidence that it has separate, decentralized purchasing and
sales departments for each of its divisions or subsidiaries which are called "profit
centers," and that this decentralized management is not conducive to reciprocal
dealing. Id. at 782-83.
